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Multisensory processing encompasses all of the various ways in which the presence of information in one
sensory modality can adaptively inf luence the processing of information in a different modality. In Part I
of this survey article, I begin by presenting a cartography of some of the more extensively investigated
forms of multisensory processing, with a special focus on two distinct types of multisensory integration.
I brief ly discuss the conditions under which these different forms of multisensory processing occur as well
as their important perceptual consequences and interrelations. In Part II, I then turn to examining of some
of the different possible ways in which the structure of conscious perceptual experience might also be
characterized as multisensory. In addition, I discuss the significance of research onmultisensory processing
and multisensory consciousness for philosophical attempts to individuate the senses.1. Introduction
Multisensory processing, as understood here, encompasses all of the various ways in which the
presence of information in one sensory modality can adaptively inf luence the way information
is processed in a different modality.1 Multisensory processes are adaptive in the sense that they
function to enhance the accuracy of perception and the control of perceptually guided actions.2
Some forms of multisensory processing, for example, deal with the challenge of tracking or
identifying objects and events crossmodally. When sensory signals in different modalities have
been identified as having a common origin in the external environment (or the
perceiver’s body), other forms of multisensory processing address the problem of integrating
them and, importantly, reconciling them when they conf lict. Some of these operate on very
short time-scales, while others involve the slow recalibration of one modality to another.
This will be a two-part survey article. In this first part, I begin by presenting a cartography of
some of the more extensively investigated forms of multisensory processing, with a special focus
on two distinct types of multisensory integration. Research on multisensory processing, it will
become clear, provides reasons to be skeptical that an account of perception as a whole can
be constructed on a sense-by-sense basis, treating different perceptual modalities as explanatorily
independent building blocks.
In the second part of this survey, I turn to examining of some of the different possible ways in
which the structure of conscious perceptual experience might also be characterized as multisen-
sory. To anticipate, perceptual consciousness might be multisensory only in the minimal sense
that experiences in different modalities are sometimes simultaneously co-conscious. Alternatively,
perceptual consciousness might be multisensory in the more robust sense that certain aspects of
your overall experience of the world at a given moment in time are not always specific to a
particular modality. For example, when you see and hear a kettle at boil, the kettle may be
represented in a non-modality-specific way as the common object of both vision and audition
(O’Callaghan 2012, 2014; Bayne 2014). These are just two of the possibilities to be considered.© 2016 The Author(s)
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on multisensory processing and multisensory consciousness for philosophical attempts to
individuate the senses, that is, to explain what distinguishes one sense from another. As we shall
see, the multisensory character of perception significantly complicates attempts to individuate
the senses by means of certain commonly applied criteria.
2. Some Varieties of Multisensory Processing
The purpose of this section is to present a cartography of some of the more extensively studied
forms of multisensory processing. I brief ly discuss the conditions under which these different
forms of multisensory processing occur as well as their important perceptual consequences
and interrelations.2.1. MULTISENSORY CAUSAL INFERENCE
Proximal sensory signals underdetermine their distal sources in the world. A given pattern of
retinal stimulation, for example, could be caused by the light ref lected from many different
3D scenes (this is the so-called ‘inverse optics’ problem for vision). The fundamental challenge
faced by any perceptual system, according to recently inf luential Bayesian models of perception,
is to infer the most probable cause of a given pattern of proximal sensory stimulation on the basis
of (1) the low-level cues present in the pattern itself, i.e., properties of the pattern that are
predictive of properties in the environment, and (2) pre-wired or learned assumptions about
the environment’s statistical structure (the perceptual system’s ‘prior knowledge’ about
the world). Call this challenge the unisensory causal inference problem.3
Multiple perceptual systems are very often activated simultaneously, however. Everyday
motor actions, like knocking on a door or preparing a cup of tea, typically generate visual,
tactile, auditory, and proprioceptive feedback at the same time. In addition to the problem of
unisensory causal inference, there is thus also the problem of multisensory causal inference, the
challenge of determining when sensory signals received in different modalities have the same
distal cause and when they do not (Bedford 2001, Körding et al. 2007, Shams & Beierholm
2010, Landy et al. 2011, Shams 2012). Bedford (2001) refers to this challenge as the ‘object
identity decision’, while van Dam et al. (2014) refer to it as the ‘correspondence problem’.
Multisensory causal inference is frequently discussed in connection with the binding problem in
perceptual psychology and neuroscience (Treisman 1999, 2003; Robertson 2003; for philo-
sophical discussion, see Deroy 2014, O’Callaghan 2014, and de Vignemont 2014a). In the
unisensory visual case, for example, the problem is that of explaining how features represented
in anatomically different visual processing areas of the brain are properly attributed or ‘bound’ to
each of the various objects visible in a scene. In the multisensory case, the problem is that of
characterizing those processes in virtue of which features represented by different modalities
are attributed to either to the same or different objects. Shams & Beierholm (2010) write: ‘At
any given moment, an individual typically receives multiple sensory signals from the different
modalities and needs to determine which of these signals originated from the same object and
should be combined and which originated from different objects and should not be bound
together’ (425). Multisensory causal inference, they suggest, is the process whereby the multi-
sensory binding problem is solved.
Solving the multisensory causal inference problem involves different types of information.
One source of information is the prior (subjective) probability that a set of signals arising in
different modalities have a common cause. On the Bayesian approach, this is sometimes referred
to as a ‘coupling prior’ (Ernst 2006, Helbig & Ernst 2007). An additional ‘bottom-up’ kind of
evidence for such inference is spatio-temporal congruence. Signals that originate in the same region© 2016 The Author(s)
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than those that don’t. One way to characterize spatio-temporal congruence is in terms of the
number of ‘amodal’ attributes shared by objects represented in two or more modalities (Welch
1999). These include: (1) location; (2) shape; (3) size; (4) orientation; (5) texture; (6) kinetic
properties; (7) temporal onset; and (8) temporal frequency. These attributes are amodal – or
better multi-modal – in the sense that they can be perceived through more than one modality.
They are, as philosophers would say, ‘common sensibles’ as opposed to ‘proper sensibles’.2.2. OPTIMIZING MULTISENSORY INTEGRATION
Capacities for multisensory causal inference, however they are implemented, are necessary for
what I shall here refer to as optimizing multisensory integration (or O-integration for short). The
initial estimates of a property produced by different modalities can conf lict. For example,
audition and vision might produce different initial estimates of the time or location at which
an event in the environment occurs. Alternatively, vision and touch might produce conf licting
initial estimates of an object’s shape or orientation. Such intersensory discrepancies can arise for a
variety reasons. Onemodality may simply have a finer grain when it comes to discriminating the
relevant property. Initial estimates may also conf lict due to the inherent noisiness of neural
computation (for discussion, see Knill & Pouget, 2004).
According to the currently inf luential ‘maximum likelihood estimation’ (MLE) approach in
cognitive science (Bennett et al. 2014 and van Dam et al. 2014 are helpful primers),
O-integration occurs when initial estimates of a property provided by different modalities are
weighted by their relative reliability and combined in a way that optimizes, i.e., reduces the
variance in, the final perceptual estimate of that property.4 Since this final estimate is a compro-
mise between the different initial estimates (in fact, it will be their weighted average on the
MLE approach), O-integration also serves to reduce intersensory discrepancy at the level of
conscious perception. A large and growing body of psychophysical evidence indicates that
human perceivers do, in many cases, combine multisensory signals in the manner predicted
by the MLE approach.
O-integration, as understood here, presupposes that the multisensory causal inference prob-
lem has been solved. ‘Our brain’, as Marc Ernst writes, ‘constantly receives sensory information
from many different sources and modalities. If corresponding sensory signals are derived from
the same object or event, these should be integrated; otherwise, they should be kept separate’
(Ernst 2007, 1). Empirical evidence suggests that the extent to which initial estimates of a
property across different modalities are O-integrated depends, in part, on the perceptual
system’s degree of confidence the signals have the same distal source and should be coupled
together (Roach et al. 2006, Körding et al. 2007).
Numerous illusions illustrate the perceptual consequences of O-integration. In the ventrilo-
quism effect (Bertelson 1999), initial visual and auditory estimates of an object’s location conf lict.
Typically, conscious auditory localization of the object is strongly biased in the direction of the
initial visual estimate. When initial estimates are not highly discrepant, the perceptual result is
that the sound you hear appears (non-veridically) to be coming from the object you see. In some
of the early literature, this effect is referred to as ‘phenomenal fusion’ (Radeau & Bertelson
1977). Different views concerning the nature of phenomenal fusion will be discussed in part
two of this review.
Other well-known illusions exemplifying O-integration include:
•The McGurk effect: In this illusion (McGurk & MacDonald 1976), inputs from vision influ-
ence the contents of auditory experience. When subjects watch a video of a speaker© 2016 The Author(s)
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/ba/, they report hearing the sound /da/ instead (a kind of phonological compromise).
•Visual capture of touch and proprioception: When initial visual and haptic estimates of an object’s
spatial properties, e.g., its shape, size, or orientation, are experimentally set in conflict, the
final, conscious haptic estimate is strongly biased in the direction of the initial visual estimate
(Gibson 1933, Rock&Harris 1967). Such visual dominance is also foundwhen initial visual
and proprioceptive estimates of the position of a body part are made to conflict (Hay et al.
1965; Welch & Warren 1980; Botvinick & Cohen 1998; Samad et al. 2015).
•The parchment skin illusion: To elicit this illusion, experimenters recorded the sounds pro-
duced while subjects rubbed their palms together ( Jousmaki & Hari 1998). These sounds
were played back to the participants through headphones, ‘dubbing’ the tactile stimulation
they received. When high frequencies were accentuated, participants reported that their
skin felt dry and paper-like. Jousmaki and Hari propose that this illusion reflects an ‘omni-
present intersensory integration phenomenon, which helps the subject to make accurate
tactile decisions about the roughness and stiffness of different textures they manipulate’
(R190).
Two points are important. First, ventriloquism and other cases of O-integration can occur
without the experience of phenomenal fusion. For example, in ventriloquism, you may experi-
ence a sound source as closer to a visually perceived object than it really is without thereby being
disposed to identify them. This, however, is in keeping with the probabilistic nature of multi-
sensory causal inference. O-integration may occur when the probability that multisensory
signals have a common distal ground is greater than a certain threshold value, but this value
may be lower than that required (in context) for phenomenal fusion to occur.
Second,O-integration seems to be inf luenced by cognitive factors. Subjects, for example, are
more likely toO-integrate visual and auditory signals at large spatial separations when the visual-
auditory pairing is familiar than when it is arbitrary ( Jackson 1953) and toO-integrate visual and
haptic signals when they have the prior, explicit belief that the signals emanate from the same
source (Miller 1972, Welch 1972, Helbig & Ernst 2007).52.3. GENERATIVE MULTISENSORY INTEGRATION
In O-integration, as we have seen, multiple modalities provide different initial estimates of a
single property, e.g., a shape, location, or temporal frequency, that they jointly attribute to an
object or event. The end-product of O-integration is a revised and, when all goes well,
optimized estimate of that property. Hence, the total number of property types represented
by different modalities remains the same after O-integration has taken place. What changes is
only the way the determinate value of a certain determinable property is represented.
Synthesizing estimates of different types of properties across distinct modalities, however, can
give rise to the representation of a new type of property, one that couldn’t be represented by any
of the contributing modalities in isolation. In what follows, this ‘generative’ form of multisen-
sory processing will be referred to as generative multisensory integration (or G-integration
for short).6
One example of G-integration is f lavor perception. Flavor properties are not represented by
any single modality in isolation: they depend instead on the combination of inputs from taste
and smell (retronasal olfaction), thermal and somato-sensory cues, as well as information
concerning chemical irritation and nociception supplied by the trigeminal system. It is only
when these diverse sources of information are G-integrated that a distinctive f lavor is perceived,© 2016 The Author(s)
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2014, Smith 2015).7
Other cases of G-integration involve combining proprioceptive information about the changing
spatial configuration of the body with information derived from other perceptual modalities. I
should note that I here use ‘proprioception’ in a broad way that encompasses the sense of joint
position as well as kinesthesis (the sense of bodily movement) and equilibrioception (the sense
of balance). Following Macpherson (2011a) and Schwenkler (2013), I also assume that propri-
oception is properly characterized as a perceptual modality.8
The role of proprioception in G-integration can be made concrete by means of two
examples:
•Representing external space:Multisensory causal inference and, so, O-integration depends on
evidence that a single object (or event) is the causal antecedent of stimulation arriving in dif-
ferent modalities. One important kind of bottom-up information for such inference, as we
have seen, is spatial congruence: signals that arrive from the same region of external space,
other things being equal, are more likely to have a common distal cause than those that
don’t (see Spence 2013, however, for some important restrictions).
The problem, from a neural point of view, is that the exteroceptive senses initially encode
spatial information using different, body-relative frames of reference (Stein & Meredith,
1993). An object’s location is initially encoded in eye-centered coordinates by vision, hand-
centered coordinates by touch, and head-centered coordinates by audition. The receptor
surfaces for different senses, moreover, don’t stand in invariant spatial relations to one another:
the relative position of your eyes, head, and hands change from one moment to the next. How,
then, is a stable, crossmodal representation of external space that can support both multisensory
causal inference and O-integration achieved?
The solution involves G-integrating modality-specific sources information about an object’s
location with proprioceptive information about the current spatial configuration of the body.
Driver and Spence write:
When taken in isolation, each modality signals stimulus location with respect to its own receptor
surface only (e.g. on the eye for vision, or on the skin for touch). Since the receptors for each
modality can move freely relative to external objects (as in eye- or hand-movements) and can also
move relative to each other (as when making an eye-movement but no hand-movement, or
vice versa), a single modality alone cannot provide a stable representation of external space. In-
stead, this requires integration of information from multiple sensory modalities, so that current
posture is taken into consideration, as well as the location of stimuli on receptor surfaces (Driver
& Spence 1998a, 254).Generating more useful representations of space (e.g., in order to derive stable visual position
across saccades) requires spatial information to be integrated from more than one sense (e.g., retinal
position to be combined with extraretinal signals about eye-position). Thus, even when attending
to a particular location in just the ‘visual’ world, it may be that more than one sense is involved in
generating a stable representation of that location (Spence & Driver, 2004, 180–81).
Supporting this proposal, single-cell recording studies andmodels in computational neurosci-
ence indicate that neurons in posterior parietal cortex compute the locations of objects in exter-
nal space by G-integrating incoming perceptual information with sources of proprioceptive
information concerning the spatial configuration of the body (Zipser & Andersen, 1988,
Andersen et al. 1997, Cohen & Andersen, 2004, Azañón et al. 2010). For example, the location© 2016 The Author(s)
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location in an eye-centered reference frame with proprioceptive information about the current
direction of gaze and the position of the perceiver’s head.9 Torso-relative location in external space
is thus an example of a new type of property produced by G-integration, a property represent-
able by neither vision nor proprioception alone. The process just described can be iterated by
further G-integrating proprioceptive information about the angles of the perceiver’s shoulder,
elbow, and wrist joints to work up a representation of the object’s location relative to her hand
(another new determinable property). Similar coordinate transformations are possible for the
other exteroceptive modalities.
When G-integrated with sources of proprioceptive information, visual, auditory, and tactile
signals are thus all capable of representing locations in external space using the same body-relative
reference frames (for in-depth, philosophical discussion, see Clark 2011). And, hence, it is pos-
sible to discern whether or not the sources of signals arriving from different modalities are spa-
tially congruent, as is often required for both multisensory causal inference and O-integration.
•Haptic touch: Unlike passive, cutaneous touch, haptic or ‘exploratory’ touch enables you to
perceive properties such as three-dimensional shape, size, and location in external space.
Haptic touch involves both cutaneous stimulations produced by different types of sensors
embedded in the skin as well as kinesthetic information about the relative positions of body
parts in space (Katz 1925/1989, Gibson 1962, Jones & Lederman 2006, Lederman &
Klatzky 2009, Serino & Haggard, 2010). In order to perceive the volumetric, three-
dimensional shape of a bottle by means of haptic touch, for example, it is necessary to
G-integrate cutaneous information about the bottle delivered by sensors in the skin on your
fingertips with up-to-date kinesthetic information about the way your fingers and hands are
moving. Haptic touch is a form of G-integration because neither cutaneous touch nor kin-
esthesis by itself is a source of perceptual information about the voluminous shapes of objects
external to your body.
This assessment has been recently challenged by Matthew Fulkerson (2014). According to
Fulkerson, multisensory integration is best conceived as an associative relation between two or
more unimodal perceptual states that directly assign or bind certain features to an object. For ex-
ample, in the ventriloquism effect, there is an association between a visual representation as of an
object with certain features at location l1 and an auditory representation as of an object with certain features
at location l2 in consequence of which the initial auditory estimate of the object’s location is re-
vised in the direction of the initial visual estimate. Haptic touch, Fulkerson suggests, doesn’t in-
volve any such associative relation. Instead, ‘[i]t involves the direct predication or binding of
sensory features onto individual objects’ (2014, 40). Hence, on this view, haptic touch is
unisensory: it doesn’t involve what I am referring to as generative multisensory integration.
Let us grant, for purposes of argument, that multisensory integration is well-conceived as an
association between two or more unimodally distinct states that directly assign features to
objects. Even if we do, the claim that haptic touch doesn’t involve multisensory integration is
disputable. To perceive a thing’s location in external space by means of haptic touch, for exam-
ple, it is necessary to represent the joint configuration of the mediating limb. This propriocep-
tive representation, it seems clear, directly assigns certain spatial features to an individual object,
namely, your own body, (or a part of your own body). In addition, it is also necessary to form
cutaneous representations in response to events that are taking place on the surface of the body,
for example, changes in pressure or tension. These cutaneous representations arguably also
directly assign certain features to individual objects, whether we identify the latter with the
relevant parts of the body, or the thing you are touching, or, as on some accounts, with both
(see de Vignemont & Massin, 2015).10 At the very least, they assign certain somatotopic© 2016 The Author(s)
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ception of other object properties, such as three-dimensional shape, that aren’t representable on
the basis of either cutaneous touch or proprioception alone.While this line of argument requires
more development than is possible here, it provides initial reason to suppose that haptic touch,
contrary to Fulkerson, involves a form of multisensory integration, namely, what I am here
referring to as G-integration.
How are O-integration and G-integration related? Processes of G-integration seem to have
computational priority inasmuch they support the construction of crossmodally accessible
representations of external space. O-integration, as pointed out above, is in many cases
constrained by the extent to which signals in different modalities are spatially congruent. It is
only by G-integrating proprioceptive information about the configuration of the body with
sources of information from the exteroceptive modalities, however, that the brain is able to
represent locations in the external world using non-modality-specific spatial reference frames.2.4. PERCEPTUAL ADAPTATION
Both types of multisensory integration discussed above operate on extremely short time-scales.
Perceptual adaptation, by contrast, can be defined as a ‘semipermanent change of perception or
perceptual-motor coordination that serves to reduce or eliminate a registered discrepancy
between or within sensory modalities or the errors in behavior induced by this discrepancy’
(Welch 1978, 8). Moreover, in perceptual adaptation, the relevant intersensory discrepancy
itself is generally stable and persistent.
One plausible function of perceptual adaptation on long, developmental time-scales is to pre-
vent intersensory discrepancies in spatial localization and/or errors in sensorimotor control due to
biologically normal changes in bodymetrics (Held 1965; Redding&Wallace 1997, chap. 2; Bed-
ford 1999). These changes in body metrics must be taken into account if different modalities are
successfully to localize objects in external space using a common set of body-relative reference
frames. Consider what is required in order to represent an object’s location using the right hand
(this is an example of haptic touch, discussed in section 2.3 above). First, it is necessary to have
accurate proprioceptive information about the current spatial configuration of the body, in par-
ticular, information about the joint angles, respectively, assumed by the shoulder, elbow, and
wrist. Such information is represented by what Brian O’Shaughnessy (1980) refers to as the
short-term body image.12 It is also necessary, however, to have up-to-date information concerning
the comparatively stable shapes and sizes of the limb segments connected at those joints. These
and other non-momentary bodily properties are represented by what O’Shaughnessy calls the
long-term body image and by what cognitive scientists sometimes refer to as a stored ‘body model’
(Tsakiris 2010, Longo and Haggard, 2010). If, however, the latter type of information is inaccu-
rate because a child’s limbs have grown longer or her shoulders have grown broader, then the lo-
cation assigned to the object by touchmay conf lict with the location assigned to it by vision. Such
intersensory discrepancy can be resolved by perceptual adaption processes that function to up-date
internal representations of the body’s metric properties contained in the long-term body image.
Most conclusions about the nature of perceptual adaptation have been based on studies of the
effects of devices that reverse, displace, or otherwise distort the retinal image, thereby causing
spatial information available bymeans of vision to conf lict with information in other modalities.
In what follows, I shall refer to these as optical rearrangement devices (or ORDs for short).
Some of the earliest experiments on optical rearrangement were performed by Helmholtz
(1924/2005), who practiced reaching to targets while wearing prisms that displaced the retinal
image 16–18° to the left (also see Stratton 1897, 1899). The initial tendency was to reach too far
in the direction of lateral displacement, but after a number of trials reaching gradually regained© 2016 The Author(s)
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prisms from his eyes errors in were made in the opposite direction, i.e.,when reaching for a
target, he now moved his hand too far to the right. This negative after-effect is standardly used
in current experimentation as a measure of the extent to which perceptual adaptation to lateral
displacement has occurred.
Helmholtz’s experiments catalyzed a research tradition onORD adaptation that experienced
its heyday for two decades between 1960 and 1980 (for helpful guides, see Welch 1978 and
Redding & Wallace 1997). Two questions dominated studies conducted during this period.
First, what are the necessary and sufficient conditions for adaptation to occur? Second, just what
happens when subjects adapt to perceptual rearrangement? What is the end product of the
relevant form of perceptual learning?
It was suggested above that adaptation to developmental changes in body metrics occurs at
the level of the proprioceptive, long-term body image. By contrast, numerous studies indicate
that a significant amount of adaptation to ORDs occurs rather at the level of the short-term body
image (as originally proposed by Stratton 1897, 1899). On this view, the end product of adap-
tation to an ORD is a recalibration of position sense at one or more points of articulation in the
body. As you practice reaching for a target while wearing laterally displacing prisms, for exam-
ple, themuscle spindles, joint receptors, andGolgi tendon organs in your shoulder and arm con-
tinue to generate the same patterns of nerve impulses (action potentials) as before, but the
meaning assigned to those patterns by the brain undergoes change: whereas before they signified
that your arm was moving along one path through the seven-dimensional space of possible arm
configurations, they gradually come to signify that it is moving along a different path in that
kinematic space, namely, the one consistent with the prismatically distorted visual feedback
you are receiving.13 Similar recalibrations of the short-term body image are also possible with
respect to sources of information for head and eye position. After adapting to laterally displacing
prisms, signals from receptors in your neck that previously signified the alignment of your head
and bodilymidline, for example, may come to signify that your head is turned slightly to the side
(for discussion, see Harris 1965, 1980 and Welch 1978, chap. 3).2.5. CROSSMODAL SPATIAL ATTENTION
Numerous studies have found that attending to a region of space in one perceptual modality
tends to attract attention to that region in other modalities (for overviews, see Spence
2010, 2014). Hearing an unanticipated sound to one’s right, for example, can enhance the speed
and accuracy with which targets subsequently presented on the right are discriminated by vision
and touch. Such crossmodal facilitation has also been found to obtain when attention is shifted
toward a cue endogenously, i.e., in a voluntary, top-down manner.
Driver and Spence’s studies indicate that the crossmodal links in selective attention involve
representations of cue and target locations in external space. What matters, for example, in
tactile-visual attentional facilitation isn’t simply whether cutaneous stimulation is delivered to
the skin on the left or right side of your body and, so, whether the tactile cue is registered by
the left or right hemisphere of your brain. What matters rather is whether the stimulated region
of the bodily surface is located to the left or right of the direction of gaze at the time of stimu-
lation, even if that region is not currently visible (Kennett et al. 2002). Parallel points hold with
respect to visual-tactile facilitation: when you are looking straight ahead with your arms crossed
in front of you, a f lash on the right side of your visual field will advantage tactile discriminations
with your left hand, and vice-versa.
These results reveal that the spatial mapping between attentionally selected locations in
different modalities is updated as the proprioceptively represented positions of the eyes, hands,© 2016 The Author(s)
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write, ‘can apparently inf luence the attentional interactions between two other modalities’
(1998b, 1322). To use the terminology of section 2.3, proprioceptive information is computa-
tionally merged with relevant sources of non-proprioceptive, perceptual information by means
of G-integration in order to represent the locations of cues and targets in external space, and it is
toward locations within this space that attention across different modalities is directed.2.6. SUMMARY: A CARTOGRAPHY OF MULTISENSORY PROCESSES
It may be useful, in concluding, to highlight some of the computational dependency relations
between the various forms of multisensory processing discussed above (Fig. 1).
First, perceptual adaptation (section 2.4) to intersensory discrepancies arising from changes in
body metrics in the course of normal development, it was suggested, functions to maintain
the accuracy of the proprioceptive, long-term body image. An up-to-date long-term body im-
age, in turn, is necessary effectively to combine perceptual information in modality-specific ref-
erence frames with proprioceptive information by means of G-integration (section 2.3). Since
such perceptual-proprioceptive G-integration is required to represent locations in external space
crossmodally (Driver & Spence 1998a/b, Clark 2011), it is also required for the operation of
crossmodal spatial attention (section 2.5) and, in addition, for the capacity to discern whether mul-
tisensory signals are spatially congruent. As pointed out above, spatial congruence is an impor-
tant source of bottom-up, perceptual information used in multisensory causal inference (section
2.1). Hence, the latter is also computationally dependent, in part, on crossmodally accessible
representations of external space that arise from G-integration. Finally, solving the multisensory
causal inference problem is required for O-integration to occur (section 2.2). Different initial
estimates of a property, for example, shape, location, or temporal frequency, should be
O-integrated if they pertain to the same object (or event) and segregated if they do not.14Figure 1. Some of the important functional relationships between different multisensory processes.
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Notes
* Correspondence: Department of Philosophy, Ohio University, 202 Ellis Hall, Athens, OH 45701, USA. Email:
rbriscoe@gmail.com1 Helpful overviews can be found in Stein & Meredith (1993), Calvert et al. (2004), Spence & Driver (2004),
Trommershäuser et al. (2011), Stein (2012), and Bennett & Hill (2014). Stokes et al. (2014) and Matthen (2015) contain
essays that address philosophical implications of multisensory processing and debates concerning multisensory consciousness.
2 This general feature distinguishes the multisensory processes reviewed here from other interactions between the senses,
such as synaesthesia, that do not have a perception-enhancing function. For discussion, see O’Callaghan 2012.
3 See Clark (2013) and Rescorla (2015) for insightful, philosophically oriented discussions.
4 This is a characterization of multisensory integration at the perceptual, information-processing level. At the
neurophysiological level, multisensory integration is defined as occurring when a ‘neural signal is different (e.g., bigger,
smaller, having a different temporal evolution) than each of the presumptive component responses and cannot readily be
deconstructed to yield the unique contributions to its formation’ (Stein et al. 2010, 1717).
5 For skeptical assessments, see Bertelson et al. (2001) and Deroy (2014).
6 Thanks to Bence Nanay for a helpful discussion.
7 In the highly ramified taxonomy of multisensory experiences recently proposed by Fiona Macpherson, the conscious upshot
of flavor processing, so understood, is a ‘cross-modalwithin-sensory-integration-novel experience’ (Macpherson 2011b, 449–50). In such
experience, there is ‘some brand new content’ over and above the contents of the contributing modalities.
8 But for opposing views, see Gallagher (2005) and Bermúdez (2005).
9 Sources of information about direction of gaze include both afference from the extraocular muscles and efference copy,
i.e., a copy of the ‘outflowing’ motor command to execute an eye movement. For discussion of their relative importance
in visual space perception, see Bridgeman (2010).
10 de Vignemont and Massin (2015), following Weber, defend a pressure theory of cutaneous touch. On their account,
cutaneous touch is the direct perception of a ‘a symmetrical relation: we feel something pressing on this part of our body
(or that this part of our body is pressing on something)…. [I]ts proper and primary objects are relations, whose relata are
generally parts of our body and external objects’. Hence, cutaneous touch typically assigns features both to the thing
exerting pressing on a region R of your bodily surface and to R at the same time. I’m grateful to Matthew Longo and
Frédérique de Vignemont for discussion of this view.
11 There is also evidence that cutaneous touch individuates objects and events in accord with Gestalt grouping principles
(Kitagawa et al. 2009, Gallace & Spence 2011).
12 Other authors refer alternatively to the postural schema (Head & Holmes 1911, Longo and Haggard, 2010) and the body
schema (Gallagher 1986, 2005).
13 The human arm has seven degrees of freedom: three at the wrist, one at the elbow, and three at the shoulder.
14 A more expansive cartography, I should mention, would deal with the role of O-integration in various types of bodily
experiences (see, e.g., Maravita et al. 2003, Petkova et al. 2011, de Vignemont 2014b). Also omitted from discussion in
this review is a form of visual-somatosensory interaction that Haggard et al. (2013) call ‘multimodal modulation’. In© 2016 The Author(s)
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about the somatosensory stimulation being received. Viewing one’s arm, for example, enhances the spatial acuity of
cutaneous touch even when the arm is subsequently hidden from sight at the moment tactile stimulation is delivered
(Kennett et al. 2001). Non-informative vision of the body has also been found to decrease the perceived intensity of
acute pain (Longo et al. 2009) and to shrink the perceived size of objects touching the skin (Longo & Sadibolova 2013).Works Cited
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